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Medical expert testimony in cases of insanity has been the
subject of severe animadversions by judges, both of trial
courts and courts of appeal, at various times, and some rather
rash condemnatory generalizations have been uttered. The
utterances are rash because it is self-evident that there are
competent insanity experts as well as incompetent ones, and
any general indiscriminating condemnation only indicates
that the one who indulges in it does not know or care to
know how to distinguish the good from the bad, and is ready
to make general deductions from this ignorance. It is unfort-
unate also that such utterances should be sent out from the
Bench, as they tend to discredit the onljr available method
of obtaining the truth and of securing justice in many cases.
If insanity is a bar to crime or if it attenuates criminal
responsibility in any degree, justice demands that it must be
excluded before the accused can receive the full penalty for
his offense. At times it may be difficult to ascertain fully and
completely the mental state of the individual, and then strict
justice requires that every effort be made to determine fairly
and positively the full measure of his responsibility. When
popular clamor is strongly against the accused, the need of a
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calm scientific judgment is all the more evident. Lacking this,.
there is good reason to believe that public clamor which, in
these cases, is by no means always right, and which when
unchecked leads to lynch law, has in many. instances uncon-
sciously perverted witnesses, judges and juries, and led to
outrageous miscarriages of justice.
The case of Patrick Eugene Joseph Prendergast, whose
trial for the shooting of Carter H.. Harrison, the mayor of
Chicago, was finished in December last, is one that is instruc-
tive and suggestive in this connection. The prisoner was an
imperfectly educated and physically and mentally defective
Irish newspaper deliverer, twenty-six years of age, whose
record is fairly stated in the summary of the evidence,
embodied in the hypothetical question given to the experts
for the defense. It may be stated here that the facts thus
embodied were not disproven or even seriously contested, the
facts of the killing were admitted, and the whole question
before the jury rested on the conditionof the accused as to
sanity and responsibility at the time of the commission of the
act. The case was clearly, therefore, one for expert testimony*
and this was practically admitted by the prosecution; who
engaged six physicians who had presumably had large expe-
rience in dealing with and treating the insane, and who might
therefore be considered as experts, to examine the prisoner
before the trial began. Of these six only one was found
willing, after repeated examinations and conferences, to say on
the witness stand that the accused was sane and responsible.
The testimony of the other five was therefore dispensed with
by the prosecution, but three of the six testified, when sub-
pcened by the defense, in favor of the insanity and irresponsi-
bility of the prisoner. Besides these, six other physicians
testified for the defense, among them two ex-asylum officers
and the jail physician. The following is the hypothetical
question submitted to.the experts for the defense:
"Assume that a young- man, born of a family of which the
grandfather was insane, presents evidence of hereditary defects
in the skull, jaws, teeth and ears. Assume that during child-
hood the young man exhibited a liking for solitude, did not
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take part in the sports of other children and had no friends
among them.
"Assume, also, further that he was a dull, backward child
at school; that about the period of puberty he became more
distrustful and peculiar and in a measure antagonistic to his
family. He began to indulge in promiscuous reading and
began to advance opinions that were queer and strange in a
boy brought up as he had been. He began to display a very
exaggerated opinion of his own ability and resented criticism
as persecution. Although professing to be a sincere Catholic
he began to advance peculiar doctrines about prayer which he
attempted to dictate to Christian Brothers by whom he had
been educated. These views were so peculiar in a professing
Catholic that they impressed the Christian Brother as insane
delusions, that he also advanced such extravagant ideas about
single tax matters, being an imperative necessity in the educa-
tion of children; that he threatened his previous teachers
whom, as pious Catholics, he claimed to reverence; that he
threatened them with dire consequences if they refused to
teach this political philosophy to young children.
"Assume at this time he was exceedingly restless in manner,
couldn't sit still for a moment on a chair, and talked in a.
disconnected fashion. At this time he was very conceited
and pompous and wrote incoherent letters. His manners and
actions were such that he impressed the Christian Brothers by-
whom he had been educated, as a dangerous lunatic. Although
professedly a pious Catholic he behaved during Mass and church.
services in such a peculiar manner as to impress a member of
the choir that he was insane. During his visit to the Church
of St. Columbkil he struck a peculiar attitude, persisting in
enforcing himself in the choir reserved for the singers and.
organist; and during very solemn services he would enter the
church with his hat on and assume different attitudes during
solemn service which were inconsistent with his training, his
birth, and education.
"Assume that in his discussions in the society connected with
the church, he displayed such peculiar manners and action, that
a member of the society who at first looked on him as a very
THE PRENDERGAST CASE.
intelligent chap regarded him as a lunatic; that although a
professed student and exponent of the doctrine .of Henry
George, he was unable to make other than illogical and dis-
connected speeches; that he resisted criticism by the members
of the single tax club as an insult and complained of their
treatment of him. That his action in the Single Tax Club
was such as impressed several members of the club as those of
a lunatic, despite the fact that he claimed to hold the same
political philosophy they did.
"Assume-that he labored under intense nervousness, stut-
tered, stammered, and would no sooner get started than he
would talk of closing. He insisted on talking when not recog-
inzed by the president and denounced him as an atheist for
bothering him. That he quoted Scripture in a discussion on
municipal corruption which had no reference to -the subject.
That at this time he complained of persecution by his family
because of his advocacy of the single tax idea; the persecution
in reality being but a friendly remonstrance against a young
man in poor circumstances trying to reform the world.
"Assume his manner and discussion at the club was different
from most members. He desired to speak but never availed
himself of the opportunity when it was in order. That on one
occasion he entered the Secular Union, an organization of anti-
church people, throwing his finger at the audience, after a
discussion antagonistic to churches, he said, 'If you men
persist in talking that way against the church we Christians
will kill you.' His manner and actions were such as to
impress a member of the union that he was a dangerous
lunatic.
"Assume that although treated friendly by all the members,
on a later occasion he resented any attempt at courtesy with a
very savage look and action. That he was continually
-writing to prominent people, the world over, incoherent hetero-
geneous mixtures of religion, economy, and politics, generally
without reference to anything. That although a pious Catholic,
he wrote irreverent letters upon matters of church discipline to
prelates of the church, so offensive in character as to arouse
the indignation of his pious Catholic relatives.
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"Assume that despite the fact that he was a man of very
defective education and was regarded by Catholic clergymen
as a lunatic and a man of deficient intellect, he insisted that he
was so powerful in the church as to secure by a letter to the
Pope the re-instatement of Dr. McGlynn.
"Assume that in November, i891, he entered a debating
club, of which he was a member, moved around the room in
a manner to cause laughter by the members. The subject
under discussion was the 'President of the United States.,
The members began laughing. That, although not chairman,
he rapped them to order, he then began to address the members
on the subject of single tax; and then drifted to track elevation
and city council, whom he denounced as robbers and thieves.
And finally, although a pious Catholic, he referred to the
intolerability of the Bishop and Pope.
"Assume that in the spring or summer of 1892, he visited
a former instructor of the Catholic Academy, with whom he
had a discussion on religion and single -tax matter in such a
disconnected way that the brother believed him to be insane.
"Assume also in the spring of 1893 he called on the same
brother and seemed to be suffering very much from some
mental trouble. He could not keep his position for a minute
sitting on his chair, sometime he would allow himself to slide
down till the back of his head rested on the chair. He would
get up and pull his clothes down and talk in a very discon-
nected way, so that the brother regarded him as seriously
demented, and called another brother of the same -academy
to the room: As the brother entered, fhe man under consid-
eration stopped and looked at the new comer .with a very wild
stare, then stood up by his chair, walked around behind it.
He had a very pompous air and talked in such a disconnected
and irrelevant manner that the second brother regarded him
as insane and dangerous.
"Assume that at this time he was just able to support him-
self in a very meagre fashion by carrying newspapers. He
claims to have elected a Mayor of Chicago, whose popularity
was notoriously great, and he further claims this Mayor, a man
of university education, who was a shrewd politician, well
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acquainted with every phase of Chicago politics, promised him
a reward for his services, the position of Corporation Counsel,
a position which could only be filled by a lawyer 6f admitted
legal abilities.
"Assume further that the Mayor appointed to this position
a member of the leading firm of Chicago lawyers, but despite
this fact the man in question so persisted in his belief that he
was to be the Corporation Counsel, that he called upon the
appointee and introduced himself as- his successor, and that
thereupon the Corporation Counsel introduced himself to the
other attach6s of the office as his successor.
"Assume further that he was totally desitute of the needed
legal knowledge, of lawyers' license, and very imperfectly
educated.
"Assume -furthermore that at this time he suddenly arose in
the middle of the night from bed, wrapped the bed clothes
around him, took a lamp in his hand and wandered around the
kitchen table in the kitchen of the house in which he was board-
ing, in such a manner as to disturb the sleepers in the same
room.
"Assume furthermore that he came back to his home at
3 o'clock in the morning during the latter part of July, ragged
and shoeless, and did not know how he got in that condition,
that he had been up in Wisconsin in a field praying for the
general good of humanity; and that he was unable to tell
how he got to Wisconsin; that for sometime thereafter
he slept in the basement of a house in a very uncomfortable
position on boards on top of a worn-out sofa; said basement
was used as a storage place for coal and wood and infested
with rats; that he slept there despite the remonstrance of his
mother and brother.
"Assume that at this time he wrote a postal card to the
Corporation Counsel; and that he could find and was to find
means to elevate the railroad tracks better than the iincumbent,
and that the incumbent should resign and give him a chance;
and that furthermore he was the only known man not a lawyer
who applied for that position.
"Assume that on the twenty-seventh of August he was seen
THE PRENDERGAST CASE. 5.51
)y a friend dodging behind a number of trees in a public park
until he finally ran into a tree in such a peculiar manner that
he was regarded as insane.
"Assume that on the ,night of October 28th he called at
the house of the Mayor, whom he claimed to have elected,
and was informed that he was then at supper; that he refused
to disturb him; that he returned a half hour later and was
admitted to the Mayor's presence, at whom he fired four shots,
which resulted in the Mayor's death.
"Assume that he then ran from the house through a quiet
-street, boarded a car and went to a police station where he
gaire himself up, stating "I have shot the Mayor, lock me up."
"Assume furthermore that he claims to be justified in the
act on the ground that it was needed in order to secure track
elevation and for the benefit of single tax; that the Mayor had
betrayed his confidence, that he claims to have forced the rail-
road companies to sue for peace and ask for terms from the
city authorities.
"Assume further that he repudiates any claim that he is
insane. Assuming such state of things what would be your
opinion of the mental condition of the person described in
this hypothetical question at the time of the homicide?"
To combat the evidence of Prendergast's insanity embodied
in the above, the prosecution called about thirty non-medical
witnesses who testified they had seen nothing insane in him.
Most of these were mere casual acquaintances, and none
could claim any specially intimate acquaintance. As .samples
of the methods of the prosecution I may offer the facts that
it subpcenaed the judge before whom the prisoner was first
arraigned, who, of course, could see no insanity in the ten
minutes official interview, and the fear and confusion he
observed were utilized by the counsel as evidences of sanity.
The Corporation Counsel also, who had testified for the
defense that the prisoner had come to him demanding his
position and that he had, in mockery, introduced him to his
subordinates as his successor, was also called to give evidence
as to his sanity, and these two, from their positions alone, were
undoubtedly influential witnesses.
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The following is the hypothetical question prepared by the
prosecution and offered to its medical witnesses:
"Assume that a young man, 26 years of age, in good health,
and who has always enjoyed good health, and who has never
been seriously ill during the whole of his life; that he had the
advantages of a common school education, and that he availed
himself of the same; that he was a constant reader and a.
close reasoner; that much had been said in the newspapers
about the elevation of tracks; and that much denunciation had
been indulged in by the press on account of the non-elevation
of railroad tracks and severe criticisms indulged in against
grade crossings for railroads; that the person referred to had
read of these denunciations and criticisms thus contained in
the press; that'he had entertained an idea that if he held the-
position of Corporation Counsel that he could do much
towards the accomplishment of that result; that he in politics
had espoused the cause of the Mayor of the city, with an
expectation that he would meet with political reward therefor
by being given the position of Corporation Counsel, or some
other position whereby he would have to deal with the ques-
tion of elevated tracks. That after the election of the Mayor
referred to, the subject of this hypothetical question has
applied to the Mayor referred to for a position or positions.
previously mentioned, and had met with a refusal; that this
so angered him that thereafter he purchased a pistol, carefully
loaded the same with the end, object and purpose in view of
killing the Mayor who had refused him the position or positions
referred to; and that on the twenty-eighth day of October,
1893, he went to the house of Mayor Harrison at a time when
it was expected he is to be at home, at about half-past seven
o'clock in the evening; that he called at the door and accosted
the maid servant, who, in response to his request to see the
Mayor, stated that he was at supper and requested him to call
again in half an hour; that he remarked 'very well,' went
away and remained precisely the time stated, and called again
at the house, rang the bell which brought the maid aforesaid
to the door, of whom he inquired for the Mayor, was admitted
into the hall-way; that the maid stepped into the dining-room
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where the Mayor was then seated at the table and announced
to him that a man desired to see him in the hall, whereupon
the Mayor arose from his seat and walked out to the hall-way,
when he was* confronted by the person aforesaid, who
deliberately fired two well aimed and deliberate shots into his
body; that while these two shots were being thus fired a
third person appeared upon the scene through the door-way
leading into- the hall in which the shooting occurred, when the
person shooting heard the noise of the opening. door, and
turned his pistol, which was aimed at the Mayor with the
view and purpose of shooting the third time, towards the head
or body of the new comer, whereupon said new comer hastily
retreated, when the person doing the shooting turned his
pistol at the Mayor, took deadly and deliberate aim at his
body and fired the shot; that at the time the said shot was
fired, the Mayor already fatally wounded and weakened
thereby was fast sinking to the floor; that said shot entered
above the left nipple and ranged downward through the body,
and which shot, together with the two shots referred to,
then and there killed the Mayor. Soon after the third
shot was fired, the person who fired the same was pos-
sessed of fear, and believing himself to be in danger, contracted
his body into as small a compass as possible, and in a bent
and stooping manner retreated from the hall-way to the outer
door of the house; that when -he reached said door-way,
seeing in front of him a person or persons who would be likely
to obstruct his passage, fired another .shot into the doorway
with the view and object of frightening said person or persons
so that they would not attack him or obstruct his escape. That
he fled to the police station in order to obtain protection from
physical injurywhich he might sustain at the hands of the people.
"Assume that at the time the accused first applied to the
house to see the Mayor up to his final escape from the house
his mind was capable of planning; that he was capable of
taking deliberate aim; that the element of bodily fear and
personal safety were present, and that he knew at the time
that he fired the shots that he had unlawfully killed a fellow-
citizen by firing three shots into his body.
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"Assume that when he reached the police station and con-
fronted the officer there, that he stated to the officer that he
killed the Mayor because he had betrayed him; that he would
talk no further about the circumstances of tht killing until he
had seen his attorney. Would you say, in considering all the
facts and circumstances heretofore detailed, that the person
referred to as having done the killing referred to was sane
or insane ?"
As the best statement of the facts indicating sanity and
rebutting the evidence on which the hypothetical case of the
defence was based, the above is certainly not a very strong
showing, and this was admitted, as will be seen, by most of
the medical witnesses for the State.
The first medidal witness for the State was Dr. J. C. Spray,
ex-Superintendent of the Cook County Asylum for the Insane,
and the only one of the six experts first employed who was
available to testify for the prosecution. The following is
extracted .from the record of his testimony:
"Q. Can you possibly remember the question that was put
by the defense to the doctors upon the stand-the hypotheti-
cal question? A. Yes, I heard it read. Q. I want to ask
you whether or not, taking that hypothetical case and asso-
ciating with it you own knowledge of the man, what would
your answer be? A. Well, taking that question into considera-
tion, with my own knowledge and observation of the individual,
I could not pronounce him insane. You can take some of
the assumptions of that hypothetical question and you would
be compelled to say that the party, if it had represented itself
in any individual, he would be insane."
Considering the fact that all the assumptions of the said
hypothetical question were merely statements of what was
proven by undisputed evidence the above admission is import-
ant and the rather irregular combination of the answer to a
hypothetical question with one's personal opinion fr6m obser-
vation was required to satisfy the wishes of the counsel for
the prosecution. Dr. Spray's personal judgment was at fault
in this case, and it is to be hoped that he is not at the present
time so ready to testify to the sanity of Prendergast.
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There were. some other points in Dr. Spray's testimony
that might be noted, but as he was not the most decided
medical witness for the State and space is limited, they may be
,passed. The second physician called was Dr.T. J. Bluthardt,
an ex-county physician, who testified that he had seen Pren-
dergast four or five times in the jail, and had talked with him
on various subjects. He said: "I have given the man a very
careful examination and made his case a very particular study,
.and have come to the conclusion that I have not found any
trace of insanity in that person. He has got fixed ideas on
certain points, he has got ideas that coincide with the views
of bverybody, but he has got logic and reason for everything
he says, everything he disputes, and everything he discusses."
"Q. Was he not coherent in his talk to you? A. Very
,-coherent in every respect. Q. Did you say anything to him
about the killing itself? A. I did. Q. What did he say on
that subject? A. The only thing that he said there that looks
to me like a fixed idea-that there is no jury that can find him
guilty of murder because he killed Carter Harrison, because
he ought to have been killed. I asked him what defense are
you going to make-if you are not going to be declared
.insane; what defense are you going to make if you are not
defended on insanity, and he said 'on justification.' Q. Now
'then do you regard that as evidence of insanity? A. I do
not. Q. Why? A. Because it is a fixed idea of a great
many people that are politically involved in questions that
they either do not understand or are fanatics in. Q. .Do you
regard him as a fanatic? A. I regard him as a fanatic in
religion and also in politics. Q. Do you believe Doctor, from
what you know of the accused, that he would have committed
-the crime if he believed that certain punishment would follow
from its commission? A. I do not know how to answer that.
He claims that he killed Mr. Harrison because he had to
remove him for cause; Harrison was in the way of his public
and political welfare. Q. I will ask you this: At the time
he fired the shot that killed Mr. Harrison, do you believe that
.at that time he knew the difference between right and
'wrong and had the power of choosing between right and
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wrong? A. Certainly he did, he knew exactly what he was:
doing."
Dr. Bluthardt in his direct examination also stated that
paranoia was a term devised to cover a condition that had
previously no English name, and was only known by its
German designation of ailgemeine Vernrecktheit, a statement.
that does not do much credit to his psychiatrical knowledge.
The next witness was Dr. H. M. Lyman, who it seems
testified only as an expert. It will bd seen from the following
extracts that in this case involving life or death he seems to
endorse the doctrine of the complete and absolute responsi-
bility of some of the insane, an opinion, which, to do him
justice, it must be said he has not always consistently held.
"Q. Now does the degree of responsibility in paranoia vary?
A. Yes, I should think it would be very variable, as variable-
as the individual cases. Q. Does the word paranoia convey
the idea of irresponsibility? A. Not necessarily. Q. What
about fear of punishment in the paranoiac, what effect does
that have on them? A. That would depend upon the intensity
and extent of the disease. Some would be afraid of punish-
ment; some would have no fear of it whatever, and would be-
utterly reckless. Q. In the first instance, wouldn't it be an
evidence of a slight attack? A. Yes,- it would show that there
was a great deal of reasoning power still remaining. Q. In
order to deprive a person of responsibility must he not be-
acting under an irresponsible impulse or delusion? A. Yes,
sir. Mr. WADE: Isn't the question of responsibility one for
the jury to answer? THE COURT: Perhaps we enlarge some-
what on the term responsibility. Mr. TODD! Substitute for
responsibility, the power to discriminate between right and
wrong, the power of choosing or not to do an act? A. It
would be necessary to deprive him of responsibility, he must.
have a loss of power to distinguish between right and wrong.
To choose between right and wrong actions. Q. Isn't
paranoia a disease of the brain, manifesting itself by delusions
and hallucinations? A. Yes, it is a disease or defect of the
brain."
The hypothetical question of the State was then given to
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Dr. Lyman, and in reply he said, "I should say he was sane."
Cross-examination by Mr. Wade brought out the admission
that every act stated in the hypothetical case of the prosecu-
tion might have been performed by an insane man, and that a
man under the influence of delusions might be insane and
irresponsible and yet appear quite sane on many points.
Dr. Lyman was followed on the stand by Dr. John A.
Benson, two years Superintendent of the Cook County
Asylum. His testimony was very lengthy, and he was very
decided in his opinions as to the insanity of the accused.
Npthing in fact seemed capable of changing them, he main-
tained that an insane man could not "perform the actions as
outlined to me in the hypothetical question and be, in my
opinion, mentally irresponsible." In this he stood alone
among the medical witnesses for the prosecution, all but two
of whom were asked the question whether all the statements
contained in the State's hypothetical case were not compatible
with insanity. One, as will be seen, rather evaded the ques-
tion, the others with the exception of Dr. Benson, unhesi-
tatingly admitted that such was the fact. The two of whom
the question was not asked, Drs. Spray and Bluthardt would
undoubtedly have made the same reply.
To show still further the opinion of Dr. Benson, when the
hypothetical case of the defense was given him, he answered
that, assuming everything in it as true, he saw no reason to
consider the individual anything but sane.
Dr. Andrew J. Baxter was the next witness, he considered
that the hypothetical case of the State indicated sanity, but in
the cross-examination admitted that the acts *narrated might
have been done by tn insane individual. He also admitted a
limited experience with insanity. The following is extracted
from the record of his cross-examination:
"Q. Now I understand you to say in answer to Mr. Trude
that you thought the man was partially insane? A. Well
row that requires a little explanation if you will permit me.
I have got some views in regard to this man myself My
belief in regard to this man Prendergast is this: That he is
weak-minded; that he is eccentric; that he is vain and pomp-
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ous and has a great conceit of his own importance and so on,
but while he is eccentric in his manner, morose in- his disposi-
tion, cross in his temper, morose and cross and so on, at the
same time the man is perfectly capable of telling what he is
doing and knowing between right and wrong. That is my posi-
tion in regard to Prendergast. . . .Q. Well, do you think that
this man's brain is, to a certain extent, diseased? A. 0, you
can have that structural change. Q.. What do you mean by
structural change? A. Anything that is brought around by
the development of inflammation, a disease. Q. Well, don't
you think that this boy's mind is diseased to a certain extent?
A. No, sir; I do not. Q. Don't you think it is abnormal?
A. I told you -he is a crank. Q. He is what you term a
crank, Doctor? A. Yes, sir."
Dr. J. K. Egbert, ex-Assistant County Physician, was the
next witness. He testified that, in his judgment, the prisoner
was sane. On cross-examination he admitted that all he
knew about the prisoner was learned in the court room, that
the actions narrated in the hypothetical case of the State might
be all performed by an insane man, and that there was a cer-
tain incongruity in an illiterate newsboy demanding the posi-
tion of Corporation Counsel.
Dr. N. S. Davis was the next witness called for the State.
He had interviewed Prendergast in the jail and considered him
sane. The hypothetical case of the State indicated sanity in
his opinion. When asked in the cross-examination whether
the acts there narrated could not have been performed by an
insane man, he replied, "Well, to say what is possible is to
assume more than human beings dan do. They do not know
what is possible. It is not at all reasonable to suppose they
were insane."
In view of the fact that the hypothetical question of the
defense was not asked Dr. Davis, one statement of his is note-
worthy. He said it was a poor time to go and question the
accused after the crime was committed; the mental condition
must be determined mainly, if not entirely, from his condition
and conduct prior to the act. There is no reason to suppose
Dr. Davis had any knowledge whatever of the prisoner, except
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what he learned during the trial, in fact it was not claimed
that he had, and yet he seemed to have made up his mind
very positively notwithstanding the undisputed record of the
insane acts of the prisoner.
Dr. Leonard St. John, a surgeon, was next called. The-
following is taken from his testimony:
"Q. Will you please give your views on paranoia? A.
Paranoia is quite a new term. It has been brought forward
by some authorities to define a species of mental disease..
Authorities differ as regards the essentials necessary for a
paranoiac, so much so that I find it covers every degree of
mental condition from a simple case of hysteria to a case of
acute mania. They are all covered by the generic term
paranoia. The authority who has quoted paranoia most.
extensively is one I have heard mentioned here to-day; that is
Spitzka, whose definition is probably more clear. Do you
wish me to give it? Q. Yes, sir. A. It is more clear than anr
of the other authorities. He defines it as a crank, a cranky
state of insanity. Q. You heard defined here by somebody a.
quotation by Spitzka. You said something about the next
page. A. That was in reference to the configuration of the
skull and face if I remember right. Q. Can you quote from
the book from memory? A. It was quoted from the book
that such an individual would have a deformed brain; that he
would be sexually perverted, and numerous other traits, and I-
think the witness was asked whether that would indicate-
insanity, such a condition of head. Such a head indicates an
idiot, an idiot only, and you will find in Spitzka, page 88 or-
86, where Spitzka qualifies it and says that they are idiots only
and that those who are insane and not idiots, there is nothing
in the configuration of the skull which would indicate anything
at all according to Spitzka. . . . Q. What do you say with
reference to that idea of his of being Corporation Counsel,
under the circumstances? A. Simply that he had a good
opinion of himself and his abilities, and .wished to be Corpora-
tion Counsel. Q. Is there any evidence of delusion in that?
A. No delusion; desire doesn't make a delusion." . - .
Mr. Trudes' hypothetical question for the State was pro-
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pounded to the witness, who answered "I would consider him
sane.
In the cross-examination by Mr. Wade, the witness said
that the fear shown by the accused when in the jail at the time
of the Mayor's funeral, was an indication, of a sane mind.
When pressed as to whether insane persons might not feel
fear, he said yes, but that it was a "sane element of insanity."
This he explained as the retention of a natural instinct in the
insane mind. He admitted also that all the acts stated in the
State's hypothetical case might be done by an insane person.
Dr. St. John is not an alienist, but this cannot account for
all the errors in his testimony. Paranoia, as understood by
specialists in insanity is not quite the indefinite thing he makes
it, and if his reading had been to any extent accurate, he could
not have believed his own statement. Spitzka- does not say
that only idiots have cranial deformities, in fact he is badly
misrepresented in this testimony. Fear, as a "sane element of
insanity," is a novel idea; as,a purely animal emotion, its mani-
festation is one of the most frequent phenomena of mental
alienation, in which the higher inhibitions that restrain it are
suppressed or weakened. The senior counsel for the prosecu-
tion, nevertheless, made the exhibition of fear on the part of
the accused one of the strongest of his points to prove his
sanity and apparently carried the jury with him, thus making
an evidence of sanity out of one of the most characteristic
symptoms of a deranged mind. That he could have gotten a
physician who claimed to know anything about insanity to
support him in this, shows how fictitious such claim must be,
and is remarkable to say the least.
The last two medical witnesses for the State need not take
much of our space. One was a homeopathic practitioner,
who had made up his opinion from a ten or fifteen minutes
interview with the prisoner in the jail and observation of him
in the court room. The other was a general practitioner
whose experience with insanity was not extensive, and who
admitted that certain things in the accused seemed peculiar
and showed indications of an unbalanced mind. Both admitted
the compatibility of the actions in the State's hypothetical case
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with insanity, and neither could be called very strong witnesses
for the prosecution.
I have not reviewed the medical testimony for the defense,
as it did not present the peculiarities of that for the prosecu-
tion. On the one hand we have the facts that out of six
alienists, selected by the counsel for the State, on account of
their qualifications as insanity experts, and who repeatedly
examined the accused some days or weeks prior to the trial,
only one could be utilized against him, and this one, not by
any means superior to his confreres, while testifying for the
prosecution, admitted the defective organization of the prisoner,
and that certain facts of the testimony embodied in the hypo-
thetical case of the defense, must necessarily indicate insanity
Three of these experts, Drs. Brown, Church and Dewey,
were subpcenmd by and testified for the defense. Besides
these several other medical men of more or less experience in
the case of the insane, including in their number Dr. J. G.
Kiernan, a well-known authority on insanity, and Dr. Wahl,
the jail physician, gave unequivocal testimony on the same side.
On the other hand we have the fact that apparently only
two of the medical witnesses for the State had examined the
prisoner before the trial, one of them, Dr. Spray, their most
competent witness as regards experience with insane cases,
made, as has been seen, admissions that ought to have
materially affected the value of his testimony for the prosecu-
tion. The other one, Dr. Baxter, also made admissions, not
only that the prisoner was a crank, an abnormal individual,
but also that he personally did not know very much about
insanity. The other medical witnesses wereapparently picked
up at random, their essential qualification being their opinion
that the accused was sane. Only two, or at most three, of the
State's medical witnesses could claim much experience with
insanity; one of these, Dr. Spray, has been already mentioned,
the others were Dr. Benson, two years Superintendent of the
Cook County Asylum, a fact which, by itself, does not prove
competency as an expert, and Dr. Blutha'rdt, who, as a former
County Physician, had had experience with insane cases in the
jail and in their trials before the county court.
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It would seem much like threshing over old straw to dwell
here on the evils of partisan expert testimony; it is the oppro-
brium of English and American medical jurisprudence and has
formed the text for articles almost without number, for the last
forty or fifty years. The evils exist, however, and we have
here examples of them. They will continue to exist as long
as courts have no standard of qualifications for an expert; as
long as anyone with a medical handle to his name can be put
forward and be equally acceptable to the court and influential
with the jury, whether he knows the rudiments of the subject
on which he poses as an expert or not.
This case, however, illustrates a more hopeful phase of the
subject; it shows that true experts can be depended upon to
give an honest opinion. Out of six selected by the State for
their well-known reputation and standing in the profession,
who made thorough examinations of the prisoner, it dared
only put one on the stand, and his testimony contained admis-
sions that ought to have made it quite as valuable for the
defense as for the prosecution.. It also' illustrates the need of
real expert testimony in cases like this where popular preju-
dice runs high, when an especially prominent and popular
individual has been the victim of a homicide. In such a case
especially is the truth of Dr. Beard's statement that the only
really valuable testimony is expert testimony, made evident.
When the whole case revolves upon the question of the sanity
or insanity of the accused, a calm scientific opinion is especially
needed, and the worth of a witness depends upon his special
knowledge of the subject in hand. And as Dr. Beard says
insanity is a subject in which the emotions are especially called
upon and real experts are very rare.
Another question that is suggested by this trial is that of
the right of the prosecution to suppress testimony that may
be favorable for the defense. When the counsel for the
-defense suspected that some of the experts' opinions might
not be favorable to the other side, they subpcened four of the
experts who had been engaged to examine the prisoner before
the trial. These gentlemen had received no retainers from
the prosecution; one of them was excused, and three appeared
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on the witness stand in obedience to the subpoena. The fact
that they had been first called by the prosecution to examine
the prisoner, was sought to be presented to the jury, but this
was successfully resisted. Of the two -of the six experts not
subpcenamd by the defense, one, Dr. Spray, appeared for the
prosecution; the other, Dr. Clevenger, did not appear on the
witness stand at all, his testimony being thus practically sup-
pressed.
Theoretically, in capital cases, the accused is presumed to
have all reasonable chances for his life, it is not according to
the-spirit of the law to deprive him of the benefit of any facts
that may indicate or tend to indicate his innocence or his irre-
sponsibility. The duty of the prosecution is supposed to be
the simple furtherance of justice for the protection of society,
and conviction and subsequent execution in a capital case,
secured by the suppression of evidence, either directly or by
legal technicalities, can only be properly characterized as a
judicial murder. ,
Fortunately, matters have not gone so far in the case of
Prendergast. Though convicted on the testimony of which I
have given samples, sentenced to death, his sentence affirmed
by the higher court and executive clemency denied, he still
lives and is awaiting his trial for insanity.
Since the above was written, the trial for insanity has-
occurred, and th6 jury found him sane. The following from
the judge's instructions will explain, to a large extent, the
result.
After ruling in the trial that the former trial had settled the
question of the prisoner's sanity at the time of the killing,
and that only facts evidencing the occurrence of insanity since
his sentence were admissible, the judge instructed the jury as
follows:
"In this proceeding the question simply is, does he under-
stand and appreciate the fact that he has been tried and found
guilty of murder? Does he understand the nature of this
proceeding?
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"Is he so far sane as to be capable of making preparation
for death? Or, in a word, is he so far sane that it would not
be contrary to humanity to execute him. This is the test and
whether he be sane or insane in any other sense it does not
concern us to inquire.
"If you believe from the evidence that the prisoner has
insane delusions in respect to some subjects, yet if you are
further satisfied from the evidence that none of these delusions
render him unconscious of his present condition or unfit him
for making preparation for death, then you are instructed that
such delusions do not constitute such insanity or lunacy as to
afford a reason for staying the execution of the sentence of the
court."
In other words, if a lunatic has sense enough to know he is
ordered to be hanged, he must be hanged. This would leave
only absolute dements and idiots to get the benefit of the plea
of insanity. The special humanity, too, of making lunatics
suffer punishment in proportion as they are capable of being
distressed by it is peculiar to say the least.
If these instructions including that, the former verdict
made the prisoner sane, are good law, they are certainly
indefensible in any moral or medical point of view.
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